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A STANDARD FOR SALVATION: EVALUATING 
“HYBRID-RIGHTS” FREE-EXERCISE CLAIMS  
William J. Haun+ 
President Thomas Jefferson, whose own epitaph proudly cites to his 
authorship of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom,1 referred to the 
liberty rights guaranteed by the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause2 as 
“the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights.”3  Yet, the current  
free-exercise doctrine, as defined by the Supreme Court in Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,4 actually 
allows states to restrict free exercise through facially “neutral [and] generally 
applicable” laws.5  Except in the “the extreme and hypothetical situation in 
                                                 
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2012, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.A., American University.  The author would like to thank Professor Mark Rienzi for his 
wisdom and encouragement, and John C. Raffetto for his dedication and insight.  The author 
would also like to dedicate this Comment to his parents, Bill and Lisa Haun, and his fiancée, 
Caroline Simms, for proving throughout this process that love is indeed patient and kind. 
 1. Considering it one of his greatest achievements, President Jefferson desired that his 
tombstone reflect his drafting of the statute, which influenced the First Amendment’s religion 
clauses, as well as the religion clauses in various state constitutions.  See Thomas Jefferson 
Found., Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, MONTICELLO CLASSROOM, 
http://classroom.monticello.org/kids/resources/profile/262/Virginia-Statute-for-Religious-Freedo 
m/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2011). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 3. Thomas Jefferson, An Exact Transcript of the Minutes of the Board of Visitors of 
Virginia, During the Rectorship of Thomas Jefferson, in 19 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 361, 416 (Thomas Jefferson Mem’l Ass’n ed., 1903); see also Michael W. 
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 1409, 1425 (1990) (explaining that the concept of religious free exercise was a 
component of American colonial law from as early as 1648, when Lord Baltimore of Maryland 
took action to protect Roman Catholics from persecution by the new Protestant governor). 
 4. 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990), superseded in part by statute, Religious Freedom Restitution 
Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-4), as recognized in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006).  Smith was originally superseded by the Religious Freedom 
Restitution Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488.  However, the 
Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional as applied to state and local government through the 
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
536 (1997).  Congress responded by amending the Act to apply only to the federal government.  
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-2 (2006).  Therefore, the rule in Smith, discussed in this 
Comment as the constitutional standard for the Free Exercise Clause, is still applicable to states 
that have not enacted legislation mirroring the RFRA. 
 5. 494 U.S. at 878 (holding that a generally applicable law does not offend the First 
Amendment as long as its object is not to burden free exercise, even if the law incidentally has 
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which a State directly targets a religious practice,”6 the Smith rule removes the 
Free Exercise Clause as a source of protection against state laws that burden 
religious exercise.7  
The Court in Smith purported to leave religious liberty claimants with an 
avenue of relief from neutral and generally applicable legislation burdening 
their free exercise.8  However, the Smith rule “only”9 exempts from these 
neutral and generally applicable laws those claims that implicate other 
constitutional provisions in addition to the free-exercise claim.10  The Court 
has applied this hybrid exemption when the claim involved a “communicative 
activity” protected by the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
“parental right.”11  Supporters and critics of the Court’s judgment in Smith 
view such “hybrid” claims as a judicially crafted contrivance to distinguish 
relief-friendly precedent from the Smith rule.12  Historical fact supports this 
cynicism: in the twenty years since Smith, the Supreme Court has not formally 
                                                                                                                 
such an effect).  The question of facial neutrality—whether a law discriminates against a 
particular religion within its plain language—is not limited to statutory interpretation.  See 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534–35 (1993) 
(“Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by 
mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects 
against governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt. . . . Apart from the text, the 
effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.”). 
 6. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 7. See id. at 893. 
 8. See id. at 881 (majority opinion). 
 9. Id.  In Smith, the Court foreclosed the use of another potential exception to the general 
rule announced, by explicitly confining the Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963),  
“substantial-burden” test, which would have allowed certain government actions to be 
invalidated, to the unemployment-benefits context. See id. at 882-85 (showing no “inclin[ation] to 
breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation field”). 
 10. Id. at 881.  The Court referred to this type of claim as a “hybrid” situation.  Id. at 882. 
 11. Id. at 881–82 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 25 (1972); Follett v. McCormick, 
321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania., 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut. 
310 U.S. 296 (1940)). 
 12. See id. at 896 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The Court endeavors to escape from our 
decisions in Cantwell and Yoder by labeling them ‘hybrid’ decisions . . . but there is no denying 
that both cases expressly relied on the Free Exercise Clause . . . and that we have consistently 
regarded those cases as part of the mainstream of our free exercise jurisprudence.” (citations 
omitted)); id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[The majority] mischaracteriz[es] this Court’s 
precedents.  The Court discards leading free-exercise cases such as [Cantwell and Wisconsin] as 
‘hybrid.’” (citations omitted)); see also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and 
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121 (1990) (“One suspects that the notion of 
‘hybrid’ claims was created for the sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder in this case.”); William 
P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 n.3 
(1991) (“The Court’s claim that [Wisconsin] was decided on the basis of a ‘hybrid’ constitutional 
right . . . is particularly illustrative of poetic license.” (citations omitted)). 
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revisited hybrid situations,13 and no federal court has justified strict scrutiny of 
a free-exercise claim based on the hybrid-rights theory alone.14  A near 
majority of federal circuit courts have dismissed the hybrid-rights precedent 
acknowledged in Smith as “completely illogical” dictum.15  Even those circuits 
that nominally permit hybrid claims struggle to employ a consistent, workable 
standard for assessing such claims.16  
The Supreme Court’s sole discussion of hybrid rights after it decided Smith 
falls within one paragraph of Justice David Souter’s concurrence in Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, in which he denigrated Smith and its 
hybrid exception as “untenable.”17  Justice Souter further derided the exception 
as either too large or too insignificant to exempt certain free-exercise claimants 
from laws of general applicability.18  These criticisms provided the foundation 
for the rationales articulated by those circuits rejecting the hybrid-rights 
exception.19 
                                                 
 13. As discussed infra in notes 17–19 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court mentions  
hybrid rights post-Smith only in Justice Souter’s Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v. City of 
Hialeah concurrence, and in a passing reference in City of Boerne v. Flores.  See Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566–67 (1993) (Souter, J., 
concurring); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513–14 (1997). 
 14. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 88 (Cal. 2004). 
 15. See infra Part I.E (discussing the treatment of hybrid-rights theory in the federal circuit 
courts); see also infra Part I.D (discussing Justice Souter’s criticism of Smith’s hybrid-rights 
discussion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye). 
 16. Although the D.C. Circuit entertains hybrid-rights claims—provided an independently 
viable companion claim is joined with the free-exercise claim—it has not elaborated on how to 
evaluate such claims.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (demonstrating the existence of a hybrid claim within the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause by successfully establishing that the “EEOC’s attempt to enforce Title VII 
would both burden Catholic University’s right of free exercise and excessively entangle the 
Government in religion”); see also infra Part I.E.  Only the Tenth Circuit developed a doctrine of 
analysis for hybrid rights, which assessed whether the companion claim to the free-exercise claim 
is “colorable” enough to suggest a constitutional violation on its own.  See Swanson v. Guthrie 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 136 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998).  Other circuits, including the Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eighth, endorse the notion of hybrid claims but have not provided an analytical 
approach.  See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 764–65 (7th Cir. 
2003); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 473–74 (8th Cir. 1991); 
Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1991), aff’d on reh’g en 
banc, 959 F.2d 1283, 1289 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 17. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 566–67 (Souter, J., concurring).  The 
Court’s passing reference to hybrid rights in City of Boerne v. Flores provides little in the way of 
analysis.  See 521 U.S. at 513–14 (“The only instances where a neutral, generally applicable law 
had failed to pass constitutional muster, the Smith Court noted, were cases in which other 
constitutional protections were at stake . . . [These] case[s] implicated not only the right to the 
free exercise of religion but also [another constitutional claim].”). 
 18. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 567; see also infra Part I.D. 
 19. See, e.g., Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5 
F.3d 177, 179 n.1 (6th Cir. 1993) (asserting that Justice Souter’s concurrence strengthens the 
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Failing to entertain and evaluate hybrid claims renders the Free Exercise 
Clause irrelevant unless a state is “naive” enough to “enact a law directly 
prohibiting or burdening a religious practice as such.”20  Without hybrid 
analysis, victims of subtle religious discrimination lack the “affirmative 
individual liberty” guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause, which would be 
necessary to assert a claim against the government.21  Additionally, without 
such analysis those cases that the Supreme Court distinguished as hybrids in 
Smith lose their precedential value despite the Court’s expressly preserving 
them.22  Absent a recognition of and standard for hybrid rights condoned by 
precedent and responsive to critics, the Free Exercise Clause stands reduced as 
only a weak guardian of religious liberty.23  
                                                                                                                 
conclusion that Smith’s treatment of hybrid-rights claims is dicta).  Every circuit court that has 
rejected hybrid rights has cited to Kissinger.  See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 20. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring), superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 
Stat. 1488, 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as 
recognized in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 
(2006). 
 21. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 578 (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(remarking that Smith “ignored the value of religious freedom as an affirmative individual 
liberty” asserted against the state, and lowered the Free Exercise Clause into “no more than an 
antidiscrimination principle”). 
 22. See Smith, 492 U.S. at 881–82.  See also Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 
165 F.3d 692, 704 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that because the Court’s opinion distinguished 
Cantwell, Murdock, Follett, and Yoder, those cases are still binding on lower courts, and Smith’s 
treatment of hybrid rights should not be disregarded), withdrawn and reh’g granted, 192 F.3d 
1208 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated en banc as not ripe, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 23. Multiple scholarly articles discuss hybrid rights from a variety of perspectives, but none 
have identified a standard from Supreme Court precedent in light of Justice Souter’s criticism.  
Instead, the vast majority of articles either consider Smith’s language and its implications, or 
explain why a particular circuit’s approach taken is preferable for hybrid rights.  See, e.g., 
Bertrand Fry, Note, Breeding Constitutional Doctrine: The Provenance and Progeny of the 
“Hybrid Situation” in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 833, 834–35,  
862–63 (1993) (considering the language of Smith to predict how the hybrid-rights doctrine could 
unfold); Jonathan B. Hensley, Comment, Approaches to the Hybrid-Rights Doctrine in Free 
Exercise Cases, 68 TENN. L. REV. 119, 120 (2000) (commenting on the flawed logic of the 
hybrid-rights doctrine and examining post-Smith treatment of the doctrine); Timothy J. Santoli, 
Note, A Decade After Employment Division v. Smith: Examining How Courts Are Still 
Grappling with the Hybrid-Rights Exception to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 
34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 649, 651 (2001) (exploring the implications of Smith with a focus on the 
need for further judicial guidance); John L. Tuttle, Note, Adding Color: An Argument for the 
Colorable Showing Approach to Hybrid Rights Claims Under Employment Division v. Smith, 3 
AVE MARIA L. REV. 741, 742 (2005) (advocating the “colorable showing approach” as the best 
approach to hybrid rights).  Other articles elaborate on how courts hold hybrid rights in disregard.  
See Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule: The Failure of the Oregon 
Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception,” 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 573, 609 
(2003) (finding that parties have generally been unsuccessful on hybrid-rights claims).  Still 
others developed their own approach based on the Smith opinion. See Benjamin I. Siminou, Note, 
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This Comment will address the existence and analysis of hybrid claims, 
illustrating how Smith both confirms the existence of hybrid rights and 
provides an analytical roadmap to handle hybrid-right claims.  After outlining 
Smith’s rule, this Comment explains how the Supreme Court has distinguished 
precedent from Smith’s rule and highlights previous applications of hybrid 
analysis.  Next, this Comment considers the fate of a free-exercise claim 
without hybrid rights in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings 
College of Law v. Martinez (CLS).24  This Comment then addresses Justice 
Souter’s criticism of the hybrid rights in Smith and the credibility his critique 
offers to circuit courts that reject or ignore hybrid analysis.  After exploring 
both sides of the hybrid-rights argument, this Comment describes the different 
approaches taken by circuit courts wrestling with hybrid analysis.  From these 
varied approaches, this Comment demonstrates the necessity of a hybrid 
analysis, and argues that the Court’s treatment of hybrid-rights precedent in 
Smith, considered with the Court’s hybrid analysis, provides an appropriate 
standard.  This Comment tests that standard against Justice Souter’s criticisms, 
and explains how the Court could have found a successful hybrid-rights claim 
in CLS.  Finally, this Comment concludes that the Supreme Court should 
reaffirm hybrid-rights claims and the existing evaluative standard, and 
encourages religious-liberty plaintiffs to bring claims that can resolve the 
remaining interstices in hybrid-rights analysis.  
I.  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND ASSESSMENTS OF HYBRID CLAIMS 
A.  A Maculate Conception: Smith Carves out Hybrid Rights 
In the late 1980s, the Employment Division of Oregon’s Department of 
Human Resources refused to provide unemployment benefits to two 
individuals who were fired for consuming peyote.25  Challenging the denial, 
these individuals argued that their consumption of the hallucinogen was 
sacramental and, accordingly, protected by the Free Exercise Clause.26 
                                                                                                                 
Making Sense of Hybrid Rights: An Analysis of the Nebraska Supreme Court’s Approach to the 
Hybrid-Rights Exception in Douglas County v. Anaya, 85 NEB. L. REV. 311, 314 & n.12 (2006) 
(arguing that the “genuinely implicated” approach should be used when addressing hybrid-rights 
claims). 
 24. 130B S. Ct. 2971, 2995 n.27 (2010) (concluding that the Smith decision precludes the 
Christian Legal Society’s (CLS) from arguing that the university’s rule requiring student groups 
to accept “all-comers” violates the Free Exercise Clause).  There was no mention of hybrid rights 
in CLS. 
 25. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (1990) (noting Smith and Black were fired for violating ORE. 
REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987), which defined “controlled substances” to include peyote, in 
accordance with 21 U.S.C. §§ 811–812 (2006)). 
 26. Id. at 874.  The Court in Smith explained the state-level appellate history, along with the 
case’s initial presence before the Supreme Court in 1987 regarding the relevancy of the legality of 
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In Smith, the Supreme Court began its evaluation of this claim with the 
uncontroversial statement that the Free Exercise Clause “obviously excludes 
all ‘governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.’”27  The clause 
accordingly has been used to prohibit government-compelled affirmation of 
religious belief, proscribing or prohibiting particular forms of religious 
expression, or the government lending its weight to a given side within an 
intra-religious dogmatic dispute.28  Yet, the Court in Smith considered the 
respondents’ argument—that the Free Exercise Clause mandates a religious-
based exemption to a facially nondiscriminatory and generally applied law that 
forbids performance of an act required by their religion—to go “one large step 
further” than the clause’s textual commission.29  
After excluding exemption as a form of relief available to the respondents, 
the Court distinguished earlier precedent that had granted such relief so 
prohibited by Smith’s rule.30  The Court clarified that these prior cases 
possessed exemption-worthy claims because the Free Exercise Clause did not 
act alone, but rather conjoined with constitutional rights protected by the First 
Amendment or the constitutionally recognized parental right—so-called hybrid 
situations.31  These companion claims protected different rights—the First 
Amendment’s “communicative activit[ies]” of speech, press, and association,32 
                                                                                                                 
the claimant’s peyote use to their free-exercise argument.  Id. at 874–75.  The Court’s explanation 
of this history suffices for the purposes of this Comment.  When the Oregon Supreme Court 
ultimately found the Oregon criminal statute invalid as applied to the sacramental consumption of 
peyote under the Free Exercise Clause and ruled that the law could not deny them unemployment 
benefits on those grounds, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.  Id. at 876.  
Using the argument vindicated by Sherbert v. Verner, respondents asserted that Oregon’s criminal 
statute substantially burdened their religious practice and, therefore, required justification from a 
compelling government interest to sustain the prohibition.  Id. at 882–83 (citing Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1968)). 
 27. Id. at 877 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559–60 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (referring to 
Smith’s assertion that free exercise is not offended by the enforcement of a neutral and generally 
applicable law as a “noncontroversial principle”). 
 28. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; see also, McConnell, supra note 3, at 1425 (discussing the 
historical underpinnings of religious free-exercise protections and their influence on the founding 
generation). 
 29. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.  However, the Court hedged its holding as a textual matter when 
it conceded that the respondents’ proposed reading was “permissible,” but ultimately concluded, 
“we do not think the words must be given that meaning.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 30. See id. at 881–82. 
 31. Id. 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The Court in Smith pointed to previous Supreme Court cases 
that involved various hybrid claims implicating First Amendment rights.  Smith, 494 U.S. at  
881–82.  In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court invalidated a religious-solicitation licensing 
system because it gave the administrator discretion to refuse a license request whenever he 
believed the cause to be nonreligious.  310 U.S. 298, 304–07 (1940).  In Murdock v. Pennsylvania 
and Follett v. McCormick, the Court invalidated flat taxes on solicitation as they were applied to 
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and the constitutionally recognized “right of parents . . . to direct the education 
of their children.”33  Separately, the Smith Court recognized that some cases 
presented hybrid situations because religious beliefs motivated the claimant’s 
desire for an exemption; however, the Court concluded those cases, which 
involved compelled expression, had been decided solely under the Free Speech 
Clause.34  
The Court further recognized that in communicative hybrid cases the nexus 
between the communicative activity and free exercise is within “the 
communication of religious beliefs.”35  Additionally, Smith acknowledged that 
the parental right and free exercise combine within “the raising of one’s 
children in those [religious] beliefs.”36  The Smith Court found in each 
precedential case involving hybrid rights that its analysis had focused 
specifically on the other constitutional principles involved, rather than free 
exercise.37  After explaining how it had previously resolved hybrid claims, the 
Court applied the hybrid requirements to the facts presented in Smith.38  
Finding that ingesting peyote is unconnected to any communicative activity or 
parental right, the Court held that no hybrid claim existed.39  
B.  Separating Sheep from Goats40: Hybrid-Rights Successes and Failures 
In explicating the free-exercise doctrine, the Court in Smith cited Supreme 
Court precedent that both upheld and rejected hybrid claims, and set forth the 
factual scenarios in which each claim arose.41 
                                                                                                                 
the dissemination of religious ideas.  Murdock, 319 U.S. 105, 112–15 (1943); Follett, 321 U.S. 
573, 577–78 (1944).  The Court also indicated the potential for hybrid claims involving free 
exercise and freedom of association.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 882  (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 
U.S. 609, 622 (1984)). 
 33. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)).  
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court invalidated laws mandating school attendance as applied to 
Amish parents refusing to comply for religious reasons. 406 U.S. 205, 234–36 (1972). 
 34. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977); W. Va. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). 
 35. Id. at 882. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 881 n.1. 
 38. Id. at 882. The Court addressed the respondents’ Sherbert-based argument after it 
explained the hybrid-rights exception, creating the impression that the two are separate exceptions 
to Smith’s general free-exercise rule.  See id at 881–83.  Additionally, the Court’s confinement of 
Sherbert to the unemployment-compensation context, even though the hybrid-rights exception 
contains no such caveat, provides further indication of their analytical separation.  See supra  
note 9. 
 39. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
 40. Matthew 25:32 (“And before him shall be gathered all nations: and he shall separate 
them one from another, as a shepherd [divideth] his sheep[] from the goats.”). 
 41. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879–82. 
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1.  “Communicative Activity” Hybrid Cases  
The Smith Court characterized Cantwell v. Connecticut42 and Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania43 as successful hybrid cases involving a communicative activity 
in conjunction with a free-exercise claim.44  In Cantwell, the Court invalidated 
a Connecticut statute that provided an administrator the discretion to refuse a 
license to solicit support for a religious cause if he believed the cause to in fact 
be non-religious.45  Although the Court by its words based this holding on the 
“freedom to act” under the Free Exercise Clause, the particular act involved 
was solicitation of support for religious views—an act that by its very nature 
constitutes a communicative activity.46  The Court additionally held that that 
the petitioner’s conviction for breach of the peace must be set aside.47  The 
Court reasoned that prosecutions for breaching the peace at common law of a 
general and undefined nature countered the interest of the United States in 
protecting the free exercise of religion and “the freedom to communicate 
information and opinion.”48  The Court in Smith interpreted Cantwell to stand 
for the principle that the First Amendment prevents prosecution of religious 
free exercise when doing so would contemporaneously abridge the freedom to 
communicate information within the Free Speech Clause.49 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania involved another solicitation statute, which 
required anyone soliciting orders for goods and other items in Jeannette, 
Pennsylvania to pay a fee and obtain a license.50  Local Jehovah’s Witnesses 
were arrested for soliciting people to buy religious books without first 
acquiring such a license.51  The Supreme Court, agreeing with the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses’ First Amendment challenge, equated the statute’s licensing fee to 
“a tax [on a preacher] . . . for the privilege of delivering a sermon.”52  When 
the combined concerns of free exercise and freedom of the press “ma[d]e [free] 
exercise so costly as to deprive [the religion] of the resources necessary for its 
                                                 
 42. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 43. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
 44. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.  The Smith Court acknowledged that Follett v. Town of 
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), also dealt with a hybrid-rights claim.  Id.  However, because 
the Court considered the case facts and holding with regard to hybrid rights in Follett to be the 
same as those in Murdock, this Comment does not separately analyze Follett.  Id. 
 45. See 310 U.S. at 303–06. 
 46. See id. at 303–04. 
 47. Id. at 310–11. 
 48. Id. at 302–03, 307. 
 49. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82. 
 50. 319 U.S. 105, 106 (1943). 
 51. Id. at 106–07. 
 52. Id. at 112. 
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maintenance,”53 the rights protected by the First Amendment prohibited 
prosecution as they had in Cantwell.54   
2.  Communicative Cases Decided Based on the Freedom of Speech Alone  
In Smith, the Court considered certain exemption-granting cases to be hybrid 
situations because, although they exclusively involved a free-speech claim, the 
cases factually arose from burdens placed on the respective claimants’ 
religious exercise.55  The Smith Court cited both West Virginia Board of 
Education v. Barnette56 and Wooley v. Maynard57 as falling within this 
category of cases.58    
Barnette involved a free-speech and free-exercise challenge to a resolution 
that required all students to salute the American flag during the recitation of 
the Pledge of Allegiance.59  A state school expelled Jehovah’s Witnesses for 
refusing to salute the flag on religious grounds.60  In Wooley, the State of New 
Hampshire prosecuted a couple who covered the slogan on their license plates 
that stated, “Live Free or Die.”61  Both Jehovah’s Witnesses, the couple 
claimed the slogan’s message violated their religious beliefs.62  
The Court recognized that both a flag salute and traveling with a particular 
license plate represent symbolic messages, which can be persuasive methods of 
communication.63  The Court did not address the religious motivations in either 
case,64 but noted that the respective regulations required “an individual, as part 
                                                 
 53. Id. at 108, 112. 
 54. Id. 113 (“The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed 
as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down.” (citing 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) (other citations omitted)). 
 55. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 , 881–82 (1990), 
superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 (1993) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as recognized in Gonzales v. 
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006). 
 56. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 57. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 58. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
 59. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 627–30. 
 60. Id. at 629–30. 
 61. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707–08. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632 (finding that the flag salute is a “primitive but effective way of 
communicating ideas”); accord Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (“Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with 
a state measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily life—indeed constantly while his 
automobile is in public view—to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological 
point of view he finds unacceptable.”). 
 64. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (analyzing the issue in terms of “the right to speak freely and 
the right to refrain from speaking” because they implicate “the broader concept of ‘individual 
freedom of mind’” (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637)); Barnette, 319 U.S at 634–35 (noting that 
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of his daily life . . . to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an 
ideological point of view that he finds unacceptable” through such symbols.65  
In both Barnette and Wooley, the Court held that the Bill of Rights prevents 
government officials from forcing an individual to symbolically affirm a belief 
contrary to his conscience—a holding compelled by the values protected under 
the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.66  
3.  Hybrid Cases Involving Parental Right 
Wisconsin v. Yoder is the only hybrid-claim case acknowledged by the Smith 
Court, in which the Court invalidated a neutral, generally applicable law 
because of parental rights.67  The Smith Court also cited to Prince v. 
Massachusetts;68 however, in that case the Court did not find a successful 
hybrid claim involving parental rights and consequently upheld a neutral, 
generally applicable law as applied to the claimant, who professed religious 
motivations.69   
In Yoder, an Amish family sought to exempt its children from a state law 
compelling secondary education because such education violated their way of 
                                                                                                                 
the issue did not turn on the religious motives of the appellees, but rather the Court’s decision 
rested on whether or not the state had the power in the first place to make the salute a legal duty). 
 65. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713 (equating the flag-salute statute in Barnette to the license plate 
statute in the present case); see also Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633 (“[Saluting the flag] requires the 
individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance of the political ideas it thus 
bespeaks.”). 
 66. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641–42.  Stanford Law Professor and 
former Tenth Circuit Judge Michael McConnell, before criticizing Justice Felix Frankfurter’s 
dissent in Barnette, explained the significance of free-exercise protection in accordance with the 
holdings in Barnette and Wooley: 
If government admits that God (whomever that may be) is sovereign, then it also 
admits that its claims on the loyalty and obedience of the citizens is partial and 
instrumental. Even the mighty democratic will of the people is, in principle, 
subordinate to the commands of God, as heard and understood in the individual 
conscience. In such a nation, with such a commitment, totalitarian tyranny is a 
philosophical impossibility. 
McConnell, supra note 3, at 1516. 
 67. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990), 
superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 (1993) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as recognized in Gonzales v. 
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006). 
 68. Id. at 879–80 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944)).  The Court 
does not discuss Prince in the context of other hybrid situations, but rather discusses it in support 
of its general prohibition against religious exemptions to laws of general applicability.  Id.  
However, by the Supreme Court’s own terms in Prince, a hybrid situation was in fact involved.  
See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165 (“On one side is the obviously earnest claim for freedom of 
conscience and religious practice.  With it is allied the parent’s claim to authority in her own 
household and in the rearing of her children.” (emphasis added)). 
 69. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165–67, 170. 
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life as members of the Amish religion.70  The Court recognized that an 
infringement on the “rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their 
children. . . . combined with a free exercise claim” warranted strict scrutiny.71  
Because the state law at issue in Yoder did not satisfy strict scrutiny, the Court 
granted the Yoders an exemption to compulsory education.72  
The Prince case, like Yoder, presented a hybrid claim involving free exercise 
combined with the parental rights associated with raising children.73  
Massachusetts labor laws prevented a mother from directing her children to 
distribute religious literature in the streets.74  Although the Court recognized 
the right of “parents to give [their children] religious training and to encourage 
them in the practice of religious belief,”75 the Court concluded that legitimate 
concerns regarding child health and public safety could justify a state’s 
constraints on that parental right.76  Unlike Wisconsin’s relatively weak  
child-welfare interest in Yoder, Massachusetts’s interest in prohibiting child 
labor sufficiently outweighed the parental-rights hybrid claim.77  Accordingly, 
the claim in Prince failed.78  
C.  Silence Speaks Volumes: CLS and a World Without Hybrid Claims 
In CLS, The University of California, Hastings College of Law denied the 
CLS student group official recognition because its statement of faith violated 
                                                 
 70. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). 
 71. See id. at 233.  The Court did not explicitly call their review of Wisconsin’s 
compulsory-education statute strict scrutiny.  However, the Court does conclude that the analysis 
requires more than rational-basis review.  See id. at 221 (discussing Wisconsin’s argument that 
“its interest in its system of compulsory education is so compelling”).  Additionally, the Court 
rejected the State’s argument because of the parent’s religious interests at stake in conjunction 
with the State’s failure to show countervailing health and safety interests.  Id. at 221, 230.  A 
compelling state interest is a key component of strict scrutiny analysis.  See Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (holding, in accordance with 
Sherbert, that when a state law in the context of unemployment benefits burdens religious free 
exercise, the Court “subject[s] [the law] to strict scrutiny and could be justified only by proof by 
the State of a compelling interest”). 
 72. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233–34.  The Court recognized that the Amish produced “persuasive 
evidence undermining the arguments the State . . . advanced to supports its claims in terms of the 
welfare of the child and society as a whole.”  Id. at 234.  These considerations informed the 
contrary result in Prince, a case similarly involving a parental-rights hybrid claim.  See Prince, 
321 U.S. at 166–67. 
 73. Prince, 321 U.S. at 165. 
 74. Id. at 161–62. 
 75. Id. at 165. 
 76. Id. at 166–67 (“[T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and 
authority in things affecting the child’s welfare; and that this includes, to some extent, matters of 
conscience and religious conviction.”). 
 77. See id. at 166–67. 
 78. Id. at 170. 
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the school’s nondiscrimination policy.79  When the Supreme Court considered 
whether a public law school could require adherence to the policy as a 
condition for official student-group recognition, the Court considered the 
policy’s requirements and its implementation.80  The policy prevented student 
groups from discriminating, inter alia, on the basis of religion in membership 
and leadership selection.81  
The law school admitted that although it refused to recognize CLS, a 
religious group, the school’s nondiscrimination policy allowed other types of 
groups “to select officers and members who were dedicated to a particular set 
of ideals or beliefs.”82  The law school’s denial of recognition prohibited CLS 
from accessing the University’s communication mediums and school 
funding.83  
Although the Supreme Court entertained CLS’s many First Amendment 
claims,84 the Court quickly dismissed the free-exercise claim in a footnote, 
citing to the rule in Smith that “the Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit 
enforcement of otherwise valid regulations” of general application that 
incidentally burden religious conduct.85  According to the Court, giving CLS a 
free-exercise exemption from the law school’s policy would give it 
“preferential, not equal treatment.”86  CLS did not raise the issue of Smith’s 
hybrid-situations exception,87 and the Court did not mention it.88  
                                                 
 79. CLS, 130B S. Ct. 2971, 2979–80 (2010).  (“CLS’s bylaws, Hastings explained, did not 
comply with the Nondiscrimination Policy because CLS barred students based on religion and 
sexual orientation.”).  For the purposes of this Comment, the CLS discussion will focus on the 
“nondiscrimination policy” as written, rather than the “all comers” policy that informed the 
majority opinion and had been adopted through the parties’ factual stipulation.  See id. at 2984.  
CLS was denied registered-student-organization status under the nondiscrimination  
policy—only that denial, if anything, would implicate a hybrid claim.  The majority evaluated the 
claim under the “all comers” policy because of the prospective relief requested by CLS; therefore, 
their concerns regarding the nondiscrimination policy are not implicated here.  Id. at 2982 n.6. 
 80. Id. at 2979–80. 
 81. Id. at 2979. 
 82. Id. at 3003 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. at 3002 (Alito, J., dissenting).  These campus communicative avenues include 
“posting messages on designated bulletin boards, sending mass e-mails to the student body, 
distributing material through the Student Information Center, and participating in the annual 
student organizations fair.”  Id. 
 84. Id. at 2984–95. 
 85. Id. at 2995 n.27 (citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 878–882 (1990), superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 
1488, 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as 
recognized in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 
(2006)). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Brief for Petitioner at 40–41, CLS,130B S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371).  CLS’s brief 
arguably suggested a hybrid-rights claim when it recognized that the right to religious association 
is “rooted in both the Free Exercise Clause and the Speech Clause.”  See id.  At a minimum, 
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D.  The Court’s Doubting Thomas89: Justice Souter’s Argument Against 
Hybrid Rights 
Justice Souter’s critique in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah attacked both the existence of hybrid rights and the jurisprudential 
consequences of their recognition.90  His critique stands as the only elaboration 
on hybrid rights from the Supreme Court since Smith.91  
Justice Souter disagreed with the majority in Smith because of his view that 
the purported hybrid cases were, in truth, pure free-exercise cases.92  
Discussing Cantwell and Yoder, Justice Souter argued that “[n]either  
opinion . . . leaves any doubt that ‘fundamental claims of religious freedom 
[were] at stake.’”93  According to Justice Souter, the Cantwell Court separately 
provided its free-speech analysis later in the opinion after its discussion of free 
exercise.94  The free-speech claim in Cantwell thus referred to “an entirely 
different issue” than the free-exercise claim.95 
Justice Souter argued that the Smith Court placed undue significance on the 
of role parental rights in Yoder.96  He considered the language in Yoder that 
dismissed the standard of review under a parental-rights claim as 
“inapplicable.”97  As characterized by Justice Souter, the Yoder Court required 
that the state’s action “must be measured by a stricter test, the test developed 
                                                                                                                 
CLS’s cryptic reference to hybrid rights demonstrates how much the existence of the doctrine is 
ignored and undeveloped by the Court.  Cf. Brett G. Scharffs. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of 
Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 37 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 300, 304 
(2010), available at www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/ChristianLegal.pdf (“One might have 
thought that this case would have been a good place to test the concept of hybrid rights or to test 
the limits of autonomy of religious groups.”). 
 88. CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 2995 n.27. 
 89. The term is a reference to Christ’s apostle Thomas, who refused to recognize Christ’s 
resurrection unless Christ Himself provided him the proof. See John 20: 24–29. 
 90. See 508 U.S. 520, 566–67 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 91. The Court in City of Boerne v. Flores acknowledged hybrid rights in passing: 
The only instances where a neutral, generally applicable law had failed to pass 
constitutional muster, the Smith Court noted, were cases in which other constitutional 
protections were at stake.  In Wisconsin v. Yoder, for example, we invalidated 
Wisconsin’s mandatory school-attendance law as applied to Amish parents who refused 
on religious grounds to send their children to school.  That case implicated not only the 
right to the free exercise of religion but also the right of parents to control their 
children’s education. 
521 U.S. 507, 513–14 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 92. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 566 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 93. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)).  
 94. Id. at 567 n.4. 
 95. Id. at 567. 
 96. Id. at 566–67, 567 n.4. 
 97. Id. at 567 n.4 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233). 
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under the Free Exercise Clause.”98  Considered along with other indicia,99 he 
was not persuaded by the Smith Court’s characterization of Yoder as a 
distinguishable hybrid situation.100  
Justice Souter’s primary criticism of the hybrid-rights doctrine focused on 
two central points.101  First, the Smith Court’s conception of a hybrid claim as 
simply one that implicates a second constitutional right in conjunction with 
free exercise would create an exception so vast that it swallows the rule.102  He 
noted that “free speech and associational rights are certainly implicated in the 
peyote ritual” at issue in Smith.103  Justice Souter reasoned that if the mere 
presence of a companion constitutional claim defeats Smith’s general rule, then 
Smith was a hybrid case and the rule that courts take from it does not 
distinguish hybrid claims—it is consumed by them.104   Second, if a claimant 
were exempt from a neutral law of general applicability in a so-called hybrid 
claim under a different constitutional provision, then there would be no need to 
include the free-exercise claim because the claim under the companion 
provision would be adequate to achieve the same result.105  Therefore, 
according to Justice Souter, the hybrid analysis is not only absent from the 
relevant case law, but attempting to implement any analysis from Smith’s 
parsing would be logically indefensible.106  
E.  Serving Many Masters: Circuits Wrestle with the Arguments 
The disputed validity of hybrid rights within free-exercise jurisprudence 
inspired a convoluted and increasingly skeptical circuit-court reception.107  
                                                 
 98. Id. (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233).  Justice Souter’s reference here is to the  
substantial-burden test elaborated in Sherbert.  See supra note 9. 
 99. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 567 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring).  Justice 
Souter noted, “the Yoder opinion makes clear that the case involves ‘the central values underlying 
the Religion Clauses.’”  Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234).  He also noted that the Yoders’ only 
defense to their prosecution under the school-attendance law was a free-exercise claim, and the 
Court only granted certiorari on a free-exercise claim.  Id. 
 100. Id. at 566 (“Though Smith sought to distinguish the free-exercise cases in which the 
Court mandated exemptions from secular laws of general application, I am not persuaded.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 101. See id at 567. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143–44 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Several circuits have 
stated that Smith mandates stricter scrutiny for hybrid situations than for a free exercise claim 
standing alone, but, as far as we are able to tell, no circuit has yet actually applied strict scrutiny 
based on this theory.”); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES, 1261–62 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing circuit disputes over the application of the hybrid 
exception recognized in Smith). 
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The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kissinger v. Board of Trustees of the Ohio 
State University, College of Veterinary Medicine108 informed the other federal 
circuits, including the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits, all of which viewed 
Smith’s hybrid-rights discussion as dicta.109  In Kissinger, the Sixth Circuit 
characterized the hybrid-rights doctrine as a theory that would strike down an 
ordinance on free-exercise grounds “if it implicates other constitutional rights,” 
but preserves the ordinance as constitutional if the ordinance only implicates 
the Free Exercise Clause.110  The court considered this “completely illogical,” 
arguing that Justice Souter’s critique strengthened this conclusion.111  Rather 
than wrestle with the Court’s words, the Kissinger approach simply considers 
Smith’s hybrid-rights language to be dicta until the Supreme Court further 
                                                 
 108. 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding the hybrid-rights concept “completely 
illogical”). 
 109. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 440 n.45 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(implying that Smith’s hybrid-rights doctrine is dicta because it has been widely criticized and 
“no court has ever allowed a plaintiff to bootstrap a free exercise claim in this manner”); Combs 
v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 246–47 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (agreeing with the 
Sixth Circuit that the Smith decision left the hybrid-rights analysis undefined and finding Smith’s 
hybrid-rights language to be dicta until further guidance issues from the Supreme Court); 
Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (agreeing with the Sixth Circuit’s 
Kissinger decision when declining to adopt the hybrid-rights approach contained in Smith’s dicta 
because the court found “no good reason for the standard of review to vary simply with the 
number of constitutional rights that the plaintiff asserts have been violated”); see also Warner v. 
City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 1272, 1288 n.12 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ 
argument for using strict scrutiny under Smith’s hybrid-rights theory because it is dicta and such 
an analysis is otherwise untenable (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 567 
(Souter, J. concurring))).  In 1999, the Ninth Circuit attempted to employ a hybrid-rights analysis 
requiring a “colorable” companion claim because, according to the court, Smith did not overrule 
the so-called hybrid cases, rather it distinguished them and, therefore, they still stand as binding 
precedent and cannot be ignored.  See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 
692, 704 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn and reh’g granted, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated 
en banc as not ripe, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).  However, the Ninth Circuit withdrew the 
opinion sitting en banc and substituted a new opinion in 2000, which vacated the district court’s 
decision and instructed it to dismiss the case on remand as not ripe; therefore, the court did not 
address the issue of hybrid rights.  See Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1142.  Before the court withdrew the 
initial Thomas opinion, another Ninth Circuit opinion, Miller v. Reed, relied upon Thomas’s 
discussion of hybrid rights to reject the claimant’s argument that his claim was a hybrid.  See 176 
F.3d 1202, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Thomas, 165 F.3d at 703, 707).  The court reasoned 
that a hybrid-rights claim requires more than the combination of an “utterly meritless” 
constitutional claim; however, the court did not further discuss the issue beyond its refusal to 
acknowledge the claim as hybrid.  Id.  In 2004, the Ninth Circuit, this time relying on Miller, 
concluded that the claimant failed to assert a hybrid-rights claim because the claimant’s 
companion constitutional claims were not “colorable.”  San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of 
Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2004).  However, the Ninth Circuit’s most recent 
decisions refuse to acknowledge the hybrid-rights doctrine.  See Ass’n of Christian Sch. Int’l v. 
Stearns, 362 F. App’x 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 440 n.45). 
 110. 5 F.3d at 180 & n.1. 
 111. Id. at 180 n.1. 
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elaborates on the issue.112  The Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits took a step 
back from the Sixth Circuit’s skepticism and acknowledged the possibility of 
hybrid claims; however, these circuits ultimately shied away from attempting 
to define an evaluative standard.113  
In contrast, the First Circuit suggested that a hybrid-rights claim could be 
successful if a claimant argued a free-exercise claim in conjunction with an 
independently protected companion constitutional claim—a constitutional 
claim, other than free exercise, which can be viably raised from the facts.114  
The D.C. Circuit also seems to have embraced the independently protected 
approach,115 but has only used the approach in dicta.116  Opinions from these 
circuits do not clearly demonstrate whether an independently protected claim is 
actually required with a free-exercise claim for a hybrid challenge.  The First 
Circuit will likely not clarify the issue because it recently disputed the 
assertion that it had ever actually considered the hybrid-rights theory.117  
                                                 
 112. Id. at 180; accord Jacobs, 526 F.3d at 440 n.45; Combs, 540 F. 3d at 247; Leebaert, 332 
F.3d at 144. 
 113. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 342 F.3d 752, 765 (7th Cir. 
2003) (recognizing the ability to bring a hybrid free-exercise claim entitled to heightened scrutiny 
but finding that the appellants’ companion claims lacked the merit necessary to survive a motion 
for summary judgment; therefore, the court concluded that the appellants had failed to establish a 
hybrid claim); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(accepting Smith’s acknowledgement of hybrid-rights claims but remanding the case to determine 
whether the plaintiff’s facts presented such a claim); Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 
F.2d 1207, 1209–16 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that the court’s holding is consistent with a hybrid-
claim exception from the general rule in Smith because this case implicated “religion-plus-
speech”—the plaintiff was forced to state an oath or affirmation that she argued violated her 
freedom of speech and religion), aff’d on reh’g, 959 F.2d 1283, 1288–89 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 114. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding 
no hybrid-rights claim for parents alleging interference with their parental right because those 
allegations “do not state a privacy or substantive due process claim” and, therefore, “[t]heir free 
exercise challenge is . . . not conjoined with an independently protected constitutional 
protection”), overruled in part by Martinez v. Hongyi CUI, 608 F.3d 54, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 115. See, e.g., Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that a 
successful hybrid-rights argument requires a “violat[ion]” of the Free Exercise Clause and having 
a “viable” claim under another constitutional clause).  The D.C. Circuit noted here that a lacking 
free-exercise claim would not be saved by an equally lacking free-speech claim.  See id.  (“[T]he 
combination of two untenable claims [does not equal] a tenable one.”). 
 116. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Here, the court 
noted that it could find a free-exercise violation even it its actual holding is mistaken because the 
case involved a hybrid claim between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, and 
“EEOC’s attempt to enforce Title VII [against Catholic University] would both burden Catholic 
University’s right of free exercise and excessively entangle the Government in religion.”  Id.  The 
actual holding was based on the court’s recognition that Catholic University fell under the 
ministerial exception from Title VII.  Id. 
 117. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 97, 98 & n.9 (1st Cir. 2008) (concluding that Brown 
neither settled the question whether “independently viable constitutional claim[s] are required to 
bring a successful hybrid-rights claim, nor did it definitively establish that Smith created a new 
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Ultimately, neither the D.C. Circuit nor the First Circuit has decided a case on 
hybrid grounds.118   
The Tenth Circuit stands alone with an articulated, explicit analytical 
standard for hybrid claims.119  Seeking to harmonize Justice Souter’s critiques  
 
with Smith’s explication,120 the Tenth Circuit has required that “the  
hybrid-rights claimant . . . show that the companion constitutional claim is 
‘colorable.’”121  Rather than proving the independent viability of the 
companion claim, the “colorable claim” approach simply requires the 
companion claim have “a fair probability or likelihood, but not a certitude, of 
success on the merits.”122  The fact-specific nature of this case-by-case 
approach inhibits the articulation of a clear rule.123  Even with the standard, the 
Tenth Circuit has yet to decide a case on the grounds of a hybrid-rights 
claim.124  
II.  ANALYZING THE ARGUMENTS, ARTICULATING A STANDARD 
The conflicting views of the Smith Court and Justice Souter on hybrid rights, 
along with the attempts of lower courts to weigh and apply those divergent 
views, raise two essential questions: First, do Smith and its cited precedent 
recognize hybrid-rights claims involving free exercise?  If so, then second, 
does free-exercise precedent provide an analytical standard?  
                                                                                                                 
category of hybrid claims in the first place).  In Parker v. Hurley, the First Circuit declined to 
involve itself in the debate over the interpretation of Smith’s hybrid-rights doctrine.  Id. at 98.  For 
an extensive analysis of the independently viable companion claim approach, see Ryan M. Akers, 
Begging the High Court for Clarification: Hybrid Rights Under Employment Division v. Smith, 
17 REGENT U. L. REV. 77, 94–95, 99 (2004/2005). 
 118. Cf. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 88 (Cal. 2004) 
(“We are aware of no decision in which a federal court has actually relied solely on the hybrid 
rights theory to justify applying strict scrutiny to a free exercise claim [as of the date of this 
decision, March 1, 2009].”). 
 119. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1295–97 (10th Cir. 2004); see also, 
Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998) (declining to 
find a hybrid claim in the present case, but acknowledging that the hybrid-rights analysis requires 
at least a “colorable” claim). 
 120. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1295, 1296 & n.18 (“Our [colorable claim] approach strikes a 
middle ground between the two extremes of painting hybrid-rights claims too generously and 
construing them too narrowly.”). 
 121. See id. at 1296–97.  The Tenth Circuit’s “colorable claim” approach is similar to the 
approach taken by the Ninth Circuit before it decided Jacobs v. Clark County School District, 526 
F.3d 419 (9th Cir. 2008), in 2008.  See supra note 111. 
 122. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1297. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Cf. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 88 (Cal. 2004). 
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A.  Hybrid Rights Exist Within Free-Exercise Precedent 
Before the Ninth Circuit abandoned the colorable-claim approach,125 it 
recognized the unavoidable problem with rejecting Smith’s hybrid-rights 
theory in its withdrawn opinion in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights 
Commission: “Smith did not overrule Cantwell, Murdock, Follett, and Yoder; it 
distinguished them.”126  Each of these cases involved claims that required an 
exemption from a neutral law of general applicability.127  If the hybrid-rights 
exception does not exist, then the cases cited in Smith are irreconcilable with 
the Court’s decision because they mandate religious-based exemptions from 
generally applicable laws—a view of free exercise that Smith explicitly 
rejected.128  Failing to distinguish these cases from the general principle 
announced in Smith that there can be no religious exemptions for neutral, 
generally applicable laws129 would contradict Smith’s holding, rendering it 
meaningless.130  
Denying or ignoring hybrid precedent fails to appreciate the vast change that 
Smith brought to free-exercise law, and the relief hybrid-rights theory 
preserves in light of that change.131 The Smith rule restricted  
free-exercise-based exemptions, drastically reducing plaintiffs seeking to 
vindicate their free-exercise rights in litigation.132  Without overruling hybrid 
cases and by applying them to petitioners’ claim, Smith’s analysis strongly 
suggests that hybrid-rights theory is to ensure the viability of religious-based 
exemptions as a remedy to free-exercise violations that are not caught by 
Smith’s rule, but nevertheless represent protected aspects of the Constitution’s 
                                                 
 125. See supra note 111. 
 126. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 704 (9th Cir. 1999), 
withdrawn and reh’g granted, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated en banc as not ripe, 220 
F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566 
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that the Smith Court called the hybrid cases “not true  
free-exercise cases” because “the Court mandated exemptions from secular laws of general 
application” (citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–85 
(1990), superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 
(1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as recognized in 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006))). 
 129. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
 130. See Thomas, 165 F.3d at 704. 
 131. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S 
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 157–64 (2008) (discussing the sea change Smith brought to 
free-exercise jurisprudence and its subsequent impact on legislation and case law). 
 132. Id.  Amy Adamczyk, John Wybraniec & Roger Finke, Religious Regulation and the 
Courts: Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & ST. 237, 240–42, 25 
(2004). 
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free-exercise guarantee.133  Furthermore, legal scholars and members of 
Congress considered the Court’s confirmation of hybrid rights in Smith bona 
fide.134 Some scholars and courts might dismiss hybrid-rights theory under the 
argument that the Court in Smith created a distinction merely to reason around 
precedent that would have otherwise mandated an undesired result.135 Yet 
lower court judges “charged with resolving a specific controversy . . . lack the 
luxury that the ivory tower provides.”136  The role of these courts is not to right 
the potential wrongs of Supreme Court case law, but “to make sense of a 
confusing doctrinal situation—to make the pieces fit.”137  By ignoring hybrid 
precedent, which the Supreme Court expressly preserved in Smith, circuit 
courts treat controlling law with improper casualness138 and diminish the 
import of free-exercise exemptions, especially given Smith’s already limited 
role for such exemptions.139  
B.  Searching for a Standard in Smith 
In addition to serving as the proverbial display case for hybrid rights, the 
decision in Smith also provides the blueprints for the hybrid-rights analysis.  
The Court’s description of successful hybrid precedent highlights the contours 
                                                 
 133. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82.  The Court’s analysis of the fired employees’ claim 
suggests that its non-hybrid status was dispositive: 
The present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim 
unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right. Respondents urge us to 
hold, quite simply, that when otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by 
religious convictions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from 
governmental regulation.  We have never held that, and decline to do so now. 
Id. at 882. 
 134. See, e.g., Congress’ Constitutional Role in Protecting Religious Liberty: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 68–69 (1997) (statement of Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School) (responding to Senator 
Edward Kennedy’s questions regarding ways in which Congress can legislate to protect hybrid 
rights).  Professor Paulsen offered a suggestion considered by other testifying experts: 
My suggestion is to consider very carefully, and to reproduce in the form of statutory 
language, all of the situations of hybrid rights already identified by the Supreme Court 
in the Smith case, plus others that reasonably can be inferred from the Court’s language 
and description of the principle, and to vigorously enforce those Free Exercise rights. 
Id. at 69. 
 135. See, e.g., supra note 12. 
 136. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 704 n.8 (9th Cir. 1999), 
withdrawn and reh’g granted, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated en banc as not ripe, 220 
F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990), 
superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 (1993) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as recognized in Gonzales v. 
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006). 
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of the doctrine.140  First, a free-exercise claim can join a companion 
constitutional claim pertaining to a communicative activity (free speech, free 
press, and perhaps association) or a parental right.141  The Court’s language in 
Smith leaves the door open for potential non-communicative and non-parental 
companion claims, but Smith’s reasoning may limit companion claims to those 
two varieties.142  Second, a communicative activity serving as a companion 
claim must be connected to “the communication of religious beliefs,” and a 
parental right must be connected to “the raising of one’s children in those 
beliefs.”143  This nexus between the free-exercise claim and the companion 
claim allows the analysis to “specifically advert to the non-free exercise 
principle involved”144 from the free-exercise claim.145  The Court does not 
explicitly address whether the non-free-exercise principle must be an 
independently protected companion claim or simply a colorable-enough 
violation of a constitutional protection.146   However, its language does suggest 
                                                 
 140. See id. at 881–82. 
 141. See id. at 881. 
 142. The Court lists communicative and parental-rights claims as examples of companion 
claims, but the language “in conjunction with other constitutional protections such as” suggests 
that the Court may treat other constitutional claims similarly.  Id. at 881 (emphasis added).  In 
fact, the D.C. Circuit’s treatment of Catholic University’s hybrid claim involving the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses indicates the plausibility of reading Smith’s hybrid 
analysis beyond just communicative and parental rights.  See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 
F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  The same could be said under the colorable-claim approach.  
See, e.g., Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1999) (refusing to find a hybrid-rights 
claim implicating both interstate travel and free exercise because the interstate-travel claim was 
“utterly meritless”).  However, Smith confined its speculation of other hybrid claims to First 
Amendment communicative concerns. 494 U.S. at 882 (“And it is easy to envision a case in 
which a challenge on freedom of association grounds would likely be reinforced by Free Exercise 
Clause concerns.” (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycess, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984))).  The Court 
resolved that the facts did not fit a hybrid mold because the free-exercise claim was unconnected 
to “any communicative activity or parental right.”  Id. 
 143. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
 144. See id. at 881 n.1. 
 145. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513–14 (1997) (construing Smith’s reference to 
hybrid rights as one where the free-exercise claim has to rely on another constitutional claim at 
stake). 
 146. However, Smith’s citation to hybrid cases decided “exclusively” upon the companion 
claim cuts against the colorable-claim approach because the cited cases clearly involved more 
than a colorable claim.  See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713–15 (1977); W. Va. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).  Yet Smith’s language creates some ambiguity over 
the requirements of the companion claim because the cited hybrid precedents are themselves 
ambiguous.  Although no hybrid precedent involved an explicitly “colorable” companion claim, 
Cantwell involved an apparently viable speech claim subject to the “clear and present danger” test 
under free-speech doctrine.  See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940).  On the other 
hand, the Court in Yoder dismissed the viability of the parental-rights claim in lieu of the  
free-exercise claim.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–19 (1972).  For a detailed discussion 
of the implications involved with accepting the colorable-claim approach to hybrid claims on 
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that the companion claim must at least plausibly exist.147  Additionally, mere 
religious belief, or the centrality of the implicated religious activity to one’s 
religious beliefs, is not a part of the companion claim.148  
C.  Smith’s Cited Precedent Refines the Analysis 
Smith divided hybrid precedent into three variations: communicative 
activities, parental rights, and cases in which the decisions exclusively rely on 
another constitutional right but involve religious freedom.149  These three 
categories possess one commonality that functions both as a guidepost and a 
limit to the hybrid analysis—all successful hybrid cases decided in the 
Supreme Court challenged laws requiring affirmative compulsion “under threat 
of criminal sanction to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental 
tenets of [the claimant’s] religious beliefs.”150  As suggested in Mundock and 
Cantwell, the affirmative compulsion in the communicative context must rise 
to the level of censorship.151  In Barnette and Wooley, cases that exclusively 
relied on free-speech grounds, this compulsion took the form of state-imposed 
symbolism.152  
                                                                                                                 
Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause doctrine, see Note, The Best of a Bad Lot: 
Compromise and Hybrid Religious Exemptions, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1494, 1506–07 (2010). 
 147. Cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 n.1.  The Court would not focus its situation specifically on 
the free-exercise principle as the claim presented was implausible.  See id. 
 148. See id. at 886–87 (“It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the ‘centrality’ of 
religious beliefs before applying a ‘compelling interest’ test in the free exercise field, than it 
would be for them to determine the ‘importance’ of ideas before applying the ‘compelling 
interest’ test in the free speech field.  What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to 
contradict a believer’s assertion that a particular act is ‘central’ to his personal faith?”). 
 149. Id. at 881–82. 
 150. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 (exempting Amish claimants from compulsory school 
attendance because mandating secondary education interfered with the religious development of 
Amish children); accord Wooley, 430 U.S. at 706, 717 (holding that New Hampshire was 
prohibited from enforcing criminal sanctions against Jehovah’s Witnesses who covered the state 
motto on their license plates because the motto was repugnant to their religious beliefs); Barnette, 
319 U.S. at 624, 626–29 (exempting Jehovah Witnesses from a public school resolution that 
compelled a flag salute and pledge by threatening prosecution of the child and parents for 
insubordination, when such consents were fundamentally at odds with their religious beliefs); 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 107–08, 113 (1943) (invalidating the enforcement of a 
license tax on the solicitation of orders for goods as applied to Jehovah’s Witnesses distributing 
religious literature because the tax effectively censured their free exercise); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 
305 (invalidating the enforcement of criminal sanctions against Jehovah’s Witnesses for failure to 
comply with a mandatory licensing system for religious solicitation because the system permitted 
censorship of religion as the means of determining its “right to survive”). 
 151. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113 (“The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of 
these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of censorship . . . .”); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 305 
(“Such a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of 
liberty protected by the First Amendment . . . .”). 
 152. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632. 
286 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:265 
 
The parental-rights category contains analogous qualifications for the 
affirmative compulsion required to garner the hybrid exemption.  Importantly, 
the Yoder case clarified that its holding “in no degree depends on the assertion 
of the religious interest of the child . . . it is [the parents’] right of free exercise, 
not that of their children” at issue because the State was prosecuting the 
parents, not the child.153  The Court’s focus on the rights of the parents in 
Yoder reveals the nature of the improper state infringement in that case—the 
state’s compulsory policy “prevented these Amish parents from making 
fundamental decisions regarding their children’s religious upbringing and 
effectively overrode their ability to pass their religion on to their children.”154  
Therefore, the parental right implicated in a successful hybrid case is narrowed 
to instances where the state’s affirmative compulsion renders it nearly 
impossible for parents to guide the religious future of their children.155   
The Prince case further narrowed the scope of affirmative-compulsion 
hybrid-rights exemption when the Court noted that parental rights are limited 
to some extent by the state’s proffered interests in child health and public 
safety.156  Thus, the Court will not grant an exemption for a parental-rights 
free-exercise claim when the interests of the state in the child’s health and the 
public welfare outweigh those rights.157  
 Both the communicative-activity and parental-rights categories of hybrid 
precedent reveal the significance of raising a companion claim with a  
free-exercise claim—but for the free-exercise implication, the state’s 
affirmative compulsion could be constitutional.158  In the communicative 
                                                 
 153. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230–31. 
 154. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 99–100 (1st Cir. 2008) (second emphasis added).  This 
quotation accurately reflects the Court’s discussion in Yoder of the fundamental right that parents 
possess, including the interest of the parents “to guide the religious future and education of their 
children.”  See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.  The Court looked to Pierce v. Society of Sisters for 
support, which accorindg to the Yoder Court acknowledged the fundamental right and duty of 
parents “to recognize and prepare [their child] … for additional obligations.”  Id. at 232–33 
(quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)).  The Court interpreted these 
“additional obligations” as necessarily including the teaching of “moral standards, religious 
beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.”  Id. at 233. 
 155. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219; see supra text accompanying notes 155–56. 
 156. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (“[A parent] cannot claim 
freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds.  
The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child 
to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.” (footnote omitted)). 
 157. See id. 
 158. Cf. Yoder 406 U.S. at 215 (“[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not 
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”).  The cases 
cited to in Smith as decided exclusively on other grounds are not relevant here because their 
resolution did not require the analysis of a religious free-exercise claim in conjunction with any 
companion claim.  See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 
(1990) (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
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context, the Murdock Court noted that religious claimants require more 
protection from a tax on pamphleteering than secular, commercial speech 
because of the censorship on religious speech.159  A secular claimant would not 
necessarily receive the same level of protection as that provided to a religious 
claimant in such a case.160  In the parental-rights context, a parent’s claim 
would not inhibit reasonable regulation if the parent based his or her objection 
on “purely secular considerations.”161   
State interests may still intercede in the context of health and public safety to 
temper the plus factor that the Free Exercise Clause provides.162  With this 
analysis, the hybrid-rights doctrine recognizes a significant exception to 
Smith’s general free-exercise rule because the claimant’s free-exercise interest 
in the companion activity “saves” the claimant from what could otherwise be a 
constitutional state regulation of the companion activity.163  
                                                                                                                 
U.S. 624 (1943)), superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 1488, 
1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as recognized in 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006). 
 159. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110–12 (1943). 
 160. Id.  at 110–11.  Although it is true that “the pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not 
distributed free of charge,” and are thus afforded a similar level of protection as religious 
publications, this language simply proves that political speech could also serve as a “plus factor,” 
much like religion did in Murdock.  See id.  However, this does not dispute that religion did 
provide the Murdock claimant a plus that, as the Court says, “retailers or wholesalers of books” 
would not have.  See id.  Therefore, the opinion’s language reveals that a speech claim would 
necessarily give a claimant the same type of “plus” factor that religion would always give a 
claimant.  Id. at 111–12. 
 161. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. 
 162. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165–67 (1944). 
 163. See supra Parts II.A–B.  Although the Court has yet to entertain a hybrid claim 
involving a sect, such as secular humanism, that does not profess a belief in the existence of God, 
the sole case on point fell into the uncontroversial territory of the free-exercise prohibition against 
compelled belief.  See Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 & n.11 (1961) (reaffirming that the 
Free Exercise Clause prohibits states and the federal government from either “constitutionally 
forc[ing] a person” to believe or disbelieve a religion or aiding God-believing religions against 
other religions, such as secular humanism).  As the Court implied that secular humanism was a 
religion, the hybrid-rights exception would likely protect it even though secular humanism rejects 
traditional religious concepts.  See id. at 495 n.11.  The potential for this expansion of the 
exception is not likely to compromise the exception’s limits because the hybrid analysis evaluates 
the extent to which a state interferes with a constitutionally protected activity implicated by the 
claimant’s free exercise, rather than the content of the particular religious belief.  See supra Part 
II.C. 
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D.  The Analytical Sequence for Hybrid Rights 
Smith’s language and hybrid-rights precedent provide a test for hybrid rights 
that is divided into three “lines of cases” with common threshold 
requirements.164 
1.  Threshold Requirements 
As a threshold matter, a successful hybrid-rights claim must possess either 
an independently viable constitutional claim related to a communicative 
activity protected by the First Amendment or a constitutionally recognized 
parental right.165 Either companion claim must possess a certain nexus with the 
free-exercise claim that pivots the analysis toward the companion claim.166  
The regulated activity must implicate both the free-exercise claim and the 
companion claim in a way that accords with the required nexus for a 
communicative or parental-rights claim.167  The state’s regulation must place 
an affirmative burden on free exercise that compels the claimant to perform 
some act.168  Assuming satisfaction of the threshold determinations, the 
analysis then branches off into one of the three categories identified in 
Smith.169 
2.  Category 1: Communicative-Activity Hybrid Cases 
In the communicative context, a free-exercise claim links with 
communicative claims that evoke religious beliefs.170  This category requires 
the imposition of an affirmative obligation on a communicative act involving 
religious beliefs that exacts a burden on their free exercise.171  Significant 
interference with the ability to communicate religious beliefs is necessary to 
reach the required level of burdening.172  Smith emphasizes that this part of the 
                                                 
 164. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82, 881 n.1 
(1990), superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 
(1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as recognized in 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006). 
 165. See Part II.B.  Smith does not dismiss the possibility of non-communicative or non-
parental companion claims in hybrid rights, nor does Smith dismiss companion claims that are 
less than independently viable.  See supra note 144 and accompanying text.  However, Supreme 
Court precedent involved an independently protected claim, which certainly avoids the possibility 
that the hybrid analysis would advert to a claim that does not exist.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
 166. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882; supra notes 146–47 and accompanying test. 
 167. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 
 168. See supra Part II.C. 
 169. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
 170. See id. at 881 n.1. 
 171. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 172. This is consistent with the conventional standard for a successful claim asserting the 
violation of a fundamental constitutional right. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391 (1978) 
(requiring “substantial interference” with a fundamental constitutional right to successfully 
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hybrid exception protects the ability to communicate information about 
religion, not solely the ability to communicate.173  If the imposition is akin to 
censorship, the combination of the religious implication with the 
communicative activity exempts the claimant from the law.174 
3.  Category 2: Cases Exclusive to Free Speech 
If in satisfying the threshold requirements, the state law requires an 
affirmative compulsion from the claimant in the form of a symbolic utterance 
that implies acceptance of an ideology as belief,175 then this communicative 
case is resolvable exclusively on free speech grounds and falls outside the 
scope of the hybrid analysis.176   
4.  Category 3: Parental-Rights Cases 
When a state law implicates parental rights and free exercise, the  
free-exercise claim connects with the parental-rights claim if the regulated 
activity involves child rearing in religion.177  However, the reasoning in Yoder 
does not allow a religious claimant to withhold children from a compulsory 
activity simply because the parent’s religion conflicts with the law.178  Rather, 
the compelled act must override the parents’ right to pass their religious beliefs 
and practice on to their children.179  However, as both Prince and Yoder make 
clear, legitimate state interests in child health and public safety can override 
parental interests even if the state regulation requires a compulsory act.180  If 
                                                                                                                 
litigate the claim).  This is not to be confused with an evaluation of the extent to which the 
communicative conduct is central to the practitioner’s religion.  Smith rejects this form of analysis 
emanating from Sherbert v. Verner.  See supra note 8. 
 173. See supra note 147. 
 174. See Part I (discussing Murdock and Cantwell). 
 175. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 705 (1977) (holding that compelling 
drivers to leave the state motto uncovered on their vehicle license plate is constitutionally 
impermissible); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 624, 642 (1943) (concluding that 
state compulsion of school children to salute the flag is constitutionally impermissible). 
 176. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (explaining that although both Wooley and Barnette involved 
religious activity, they were decided purely on free-speech grounds (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 
713; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642)). 
 177. See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text. 
 178. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972) (concluding that a mere religious 
objection does not allow “every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which 
society as a whole has important interests”). 
 179. See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 99–100 (1st Cir. 2008) ([C]ompulsory 
attendance at any school—whether public, private, or home-based—prevented these Amish 
parents from making fundamental decisions regarding their children’s religious upbringing and 
effectively overrode their ability to pass their religion on to their children as their faith required.” 
(citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233–35)). 
 180. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234 (determining that Wisconsin’s proffered interest in child 
health and welfare through compulsory education could not trump the Yoders’ right to pass 
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the state’s has no interest or its interest is not compelling, the analysis ends in 
favor of the parents.181  
III.  COMMENTARY ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF APPLYING HYBRID RIGHTS 
A.  CLS Shows the Peril of Free Exercise Without Hybrid Rights 
The CLS decision demonstrates both the significance of ignoring hybrid 
claims and the effect of such claims.182  If the Court had considered the hybrid 
standard, then it never could have relegated CLS’s free-exercise argument to 
one footnote.183  In fact, the proposed standard could have provided an avenue 
for CLS’s success under a hybrid theory considering the nondiscrimination 
policy. 
CLS would have had to first demonstrate a plausible companion 
constitutional claim—either a communicative activity or parental right 
implicated with their free-exercise claim.184  The CLS majority correctly 
recognized the communicative activity of “expressive association” within the 
case facts.185  Because “expressive association in this case is ‘the functional 
equivalent of speech itself,’”186 a viable companion, communicative claim 
existed, provided that CLS had an implicated free-exercise interest with the 
requisite nexus to its communicative claim.187  The communicative activity at 
issue pertained to the communication of religious beliefs through CLS’s 
advocacy of its statement of faith.  The law school required that CLS open its 
doors to all students regardless of religious beliefs to gain recognized 
organization status and university benefits.188  Such a requirement is 
                                                                                                                 
religion on to their children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944) (noting that a 
parent cannot claim freedom from a compulsory act such as child vaccination due to child health 
and public safety concerns); see also Prince, 321 U.S. at 168–69 (holding that the state interests 
in child health and safety in preventing certain forms of child labor superseded a parental interest 
in passing religion on to children). 
 181. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 (“[I]n order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance 
beyond the eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a 
legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of 
religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to 
override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
 182. CLS, 130B S. Ct. 2971, 2995 n.27 (2010). 
 183. See id. 
 184. See supra Part II.B. 
 185. CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 2985. 
 186. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 35, CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 2985 (No. 08-1371)). 
 187. See supra Part II.B; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997) 
(describing Smith as holding that “a neutral, generally applicable law . . . fail[s] to pass 
constitutional muster” when a free-exercise claim—in addition to another constitutional claim—is 
brought). 
 188. CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 2950.  The use of the law school’s communication avenues is 
limited to recognized student organizations only.  Id. at 2979.  That the law school denied CLS 
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tantamount to an affirmative compulsion because CLS would be forced to set 
aside its statement of faith and would no longer be able to advocate its 
religious beliefs effectively.189  
If CLS had met the hybrid threshold requirements, then analysis would have 
adverted to the non-free-exercise principle190—CLS’s communicative 
companion claim.191  Under its nondiscrimination policy,192 the law school 
prohibited CLS, as an official student group, from denying membership or 
leadership roles to those who did not adhere to its statement of faith.193  The 
law school’s denial of official statutes, and the consequent denial of access to 
the schools’ communicative forums, implicates relatively straightforward 
viewpoint discrimination because it came while granting political, social, and 
cultural groups official status even though they deny similar statuses to 
students based on ideological beliefs.194  
                                                                                                                 
this status because its statement of faith did not conform with the nondiscrimination policy 
implicates the concerns that those avenues would be used to communicate the beliefs contained in 
the statement of Smith.  The statement of faith requires, among other things, adherence to 
Christian teachings regarding One God in Three Persons, accepting Jesus Christ as humanity’s 
savior, and the active presence of the Holy Spirit in one’s life.  Id. at 2980 n.3 
 189. Id. at 2980–81.  Had a hybrid-rights argument been considered, CLS would likely have 
had to address why the interference on its free exercise still rose to the same level as the hybrid 
cases Smith recognized, even though no apparent threat of criminal sanctions existed.  CLS could 
plausibly respond that the focus of the hybrid analysis here is on the level of imposition on its 
exercise and whether it rises to affirmative compulsion—not whether the State choose to classify 
that imposition as criminal.  The hypothetical argument above proceeds on CLS reasoning in this 
fashion. 
 190. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 n.1 (1990), 
superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 (1993) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as recognized in Gonzales v. 
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006). 
 191. The hybrid analysis does not resolve the dispute over whether a companion claim must 
be independently protected by the Constitution or simply raise a colorable violation.  See supra 
Part II.B.  However, a hybrid-rights claimant would be wise to analyze a companion claim under 
the higher standard because an independently protected claim is certainly colorable, but the 
opposite is not necessarily true. 
 192. See supra note 79 (discussing why the nondiscrimination policy is considered in this 
Comment rather than the “all comers” policy). 
 193. CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 2980. 
 194. See id. at 3010 (Alito, J., dissenting).  The First Amendment’s opposition to viewpoint 
discrimination is considered a “bedrock principle” by the Supreme Court.  See Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is 
that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the 
idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” (citations omitted)).  As Justice Samuel Alito, Jr. noted for 
the dissent, the Court did not try to defend the law school’s nondiscrimination policy as 
constitutional because any attempt to do so would have failed.  See CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 3010.  
The language of the nondicrimination policy demonstrates the law school’s intent to disfavor 
religious groups specifically, while amounting to “patent viewpoint discrimination.”  See id. 
292 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:265 
 
With the companion claim satisfied, the Court could have then determined 
the particular what category of hybrid case at issue.  Given the independent 
viability of CLS’s speech claim,195 the case presents an analytical analogy to 
communicative category cases, such as Cantwell and Murdock.196   
Here, CLS’s hybrid claim analogizes comfortably to the claim at issue in 
Murdock.197  The law school’s denial of communicative forums to CLS 
because its statement of faith required those that advance it actually share it 
significantly interfered with an “age old type of evangelism”—advertising 
religious events and advocating its religious belief.198  Denying CLS access to 
communicative avenues made available to other groups is arguably a more 
potent example of censorship than experienced by the claimants in Murdock, in 
which Pennsylvania simply taxed their use of communicative avenues.199  
After satisfying a prima-facie hybrid analysis, it is plausible CLS could have 
prevailed on these facts.200  
B.  The Hybrid Standard: Resolving Ambiguity, Critiques 
The hybrid analysis detailed above clarifies the utility of the hybrid 
precedent displayed in Smith. Its application could robustly reinvigorate  
free-exercise jurisprudence for victims of subtle religious discrimination.201  
                                                 
 195. See supra Part II.D.I (discussing independent-viability claims). 
 196. See supra Part II.D.2.  However, Justice Alito’s dissent permits the inference that CLS’s 
expressive-association claim—unconstitutional compulsion to associate with others with whom 
they disagree—more closely aligns with claims that can be decided upon those grounds alone, 
apart from the free-exercise interest as in Barnette and Wooley.  See CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 3012 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“As our cases have recognized, the right of expressive association permits 
a group to exclude an applicant for membership only if the admission of that person would 
‘affec[t] in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000)); supra, 
Parts I.B.2, II.D.3. 
 197. See supra Part II.D.2. 
 198. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110 (1943) (“[S]preading one’s religious 
beliefs or preaching the Gospel through distribution of religious literature and through personal 
visitations is an age-old type of evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional protection as the 
more orthodox types.”). 
 199. Compare CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 3008 (noting the CLS was prevented from using campus 
facilities with few exceptions, and from accessing the school’s communication avenues), with 
Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106 (describing the state law at issue, which required paying a tax to canvas 
or solicit). 
 200. Cf. Scharffs, supra note 89, at 304 (“One might have thought that this case would have 
been a good place to test the concept of hybrid rights or to test the limits of autonomy of religious 
groups.”). 
 201. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1387–92 (6th 
ed. 2000) (discussing the decrease in free-exercise relief post-Smith due to the lack of  
strict-scrutiny protection for plaintiffs). 
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Importantly, the standard provides a response to Justice Souter’s prominent 
two-pronged critique.202 
Unlike the case-by-case colorable-claim theory, developed to reconcile 
Smith’s critics with Smith’s language,203 this standard strives to provide the 
missing analysis through the hybrid precedent confirmed in Smith.204  Having 
an evaluative standard gives circuit courts appropriate guidance through 
binding, precedential case law.205  The recognition of hybrid rights and their 
evaluative standard would bolster efforts by the circuits to protect those hybrid 
rights while awaiting a doctrine from the Supreme Court for evaluating the 
claims.206  
During the intervening time, religious-liberty plaintiffs should work to expel 
the ambiguity remaining within the standard.  Although some precedential 
cases successfully invoking hybrid rights have suggested a requirement that the 
state demonstrate an interest rising above a rational basis,207 the Court should 
make it clear that hybrid scrutiny is indeed strict scrutiny, rather than a 
variation of intermediate scrutiny.208  Additionally, the sufficiency of a 
colorable companion claim to trigger the hybrid analysis209 and the limitation 
of companion claims to communicative activities and parental rights, are issues 
left undetermined in successful hybrid precedent.210  The former issue is 
consequential to the characterization of a potential hybrid case, as CLS 
                                                 
 202. See supra Part I.D. 
 203. See, e.g., Santoli, supra note 23, at 669 (“[T]he ‘colorable claim’ theory to the hybrid 
rights exception is best suited to weigh the companion claim.”); Tuttle, supra note 23, at 722 
(“[T]he colorable showing approach is needed to clear up the ambiguity surrounding the hybrid 
rights exception.”). 
 204. See supra Parts II.B–D. 
 205. See Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (1998) (noting that 
“this case illustrates the difficulty of applying the Smith exception” and expressing uncertainty 
over what the “exception” requires other than, at least, a colorable claim). 
 206. See supra Part I.E. 
 207. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (“[W]hen the interests of 
parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more 
than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State’ is 
required to sustain the validity of the State’s requirement under the First Amendment.”). 
 208. Cf. Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of Religion After the Fall: The Case for 
Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925, 930 (1998) (explaining that Smith stated 
hybrid claims are to be evaluated using strict scrutiny, but noting that the Supreme Court failed to 
explain its rationale for using this test). 
 209. See supra note 148. 
 210. See supra note 148 and accompanying text; see also William L. Esser IV, Note, 
Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 238 (1998) (noting that judicial treatment of Smith’s ambiguous 
language is inconclusive but the courts that have addressed this issue tend to limit the scope of 
potential companion claims).  For an elaboration on the variety of claims brought as hybrids, see 
Esser, supra, at 240–42. 
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demonstrates.211  Religious-liberty plaintiffs would be wise to employ the 
hybrid-standard framework outlined above in litigation to refine these 
undetermined aspects of the hybrid analysis in the circuit courts before the 
Supreme Court’s ultimate resolution.   
Despite its interstices, the standard refutes Justice Souter’s influential 
criticisms of hybrid rights.  As noted above, the circuit courts that have 
rejected hybrid rights as dicta rely on Justice Souter’s concurrence.212  
However, the merits of Smith’s hybrid-rights exception are not the issue for 
circuits contending with hybrid claims so long as Smith remains good law, no 
matter the merits of Justice Souter’s general critiques of the decision.  The 
issue for courts contending with hybrid claims is what standard to apply to 
such claims.213  
Justice Souter first argued that a proper understanding of the hybrid-rights 
exception would in theory be “so vast as to swallow the Smith rule.”214  Yet, 
the hybrid analysis articulated above demonstrates the rarity of successful 
hybrid claims.215  Applicable companion claims are limited because they must 
be constitutionally protected, implicated by the free-exercise claim, and 
reaching some colorable quality.216  Furthermore, hybrid claims require 
affirmative compulsion, characterized as state-imposed symbolic speech, the 
equivalent of censorship, or overriding parental control of a child’s religious 
upbringing.217  Beyond these general requirements, further limitations exist 
within specific variations of hybrid cases.  In the communicative cases, 
censorship must put the ability of the claimant to communicate at stake.218  For 
example, the CLS case implicated such censorship only because the law 
school’s policy eliminated communicative avenues on campus.219  In the 
parental prong, the state’s overriding action is permissible if the state can show 
a legitimate interest in the child’s health and public safety.220  
Justice Souter’s second argument questioned the relevance of adding a  
free-exercise claim to an independently viable claim that would alone warrant 
an exemption.221  However, this argument ignores what hybrid-rights precedent 
                                                 
 211. See infra Part III (discussing CLS). 
 212. See supra Part I.E. 
 213. See supra Part I.E. 
 214. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566 
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 215. See supra Part II.D & note 212. 
 216. See supra Parts II.B, II.D.1. 
 217. See supra Part II.C. 
 218. See supra Part II.D.2. 
 219. See Part III.A. 
 220. See supra Parts II.C, II.D.4. 
 221. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring). 
2011] Evaluating "Hybrid-Rights" Free-Exercise Claims 295 
 
confirms: the free-exercise claim adds a plus factor that could otherwise be 
unavailable on purely secular grounds.222  When a state’s action attempts to 
override the parental interest in a child’s religious upbringing, barring safety 
considerations, a parent can bring a claim that would not likely stand on purely 
secular grounds.223  Similarly, the communicative context shows that less 
protected forms of speech, such as commercial speech, could never provide the 
same degree of relief that religiously based communication can under the 
hybrid analysis.224  For example, in CLS, a non-religious school group would 
be unable to engage in the religious discrimination that, under a hybrid 
analysis, CLS could engage in, even if it wanted to or thought it necessary.225  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
So long as Smith’s rule prohibiting religious exemptions to neutral, generally 
applicable laws controls free-exercise claims, the Court’s only recognized 
exception must possess a clear standard.  Reading successful hybrid-rights 
precedent through Smith’s lens reveals a standard comporting with the Court’s 
language in Smith and illuminating circuit court ambiguity.  Most importantly, 
it provides a vibrant avenue of relief for the constitutional right given first 
billing, but secondary treatment,226 in the Bill of Rights. 
 
                                                 
 222. See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text.  One scholar has criticized hybrid 
rights by using Justice Souter’s second argument to support the contention that a hybrid-rights 
theory, if valid, would allow religious speakers to claim greater constitutional protection than 
secular speakers against otherwise neutral, generally applicable laws.  See Alan Brownstein, Why 
Conservatives, and Others, Have Trouble Supporting the Meaningful Enforcement of Free 
Exercise Rights, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 925, 933 n.30 (2010).  However, this argument 
ignores the significance behind the constitutional enumeration of the free-exercise right.  The 
specific enumeration itself suggests an elevation above some other forms of communicative 
exercise.  See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
 223. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
 224. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
 225. CLS, 130B S. Ct. 2971, 3012 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“It bears emphasis that 
permitting religious groups to limit membership to those who share the groups’ beliefs would not 
have the effect of allowing other groups to discriminate on the basis of religion.”). 
 226. See, e.g., Vincent Martin Bonventre, The Fall of Free Exercise: From ‘No Law’ to 
Compelling Interests to Any Law Otherwise Valid, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1399, 1415 (2007) (“The 
Supreme Court majority in Smith acknowledged the inevitable burden on free exercise resulting 
from its judicial passivity in protecting religious liberty. ‘[L]eaving accommodation to the 
political process,’ Scalia conceded, ‘will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices 
that are not widely engaged in.’ But he justified this as a ‘consequence of democratic government 
[that] must be preferred’—preferred, apparently, to taking free exercise more seriously by 
insuring more rigorous safeguards.” (quoting Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded in part by statute, RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §2, 107 Stat. 
1488, 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), as 
recognized in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 
(2006))). 
296 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:265 
 
 
 
 
